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Abstract
Republicans hold that people are dominated merely in virtue of oth-
ers’ having unconstrained abilities to frustrate their choices. They argue
further that public officials may dominate citizens unless subject to pop-
ular control. Critics identify a dilemma. To maintain the possibility of
popular control, republicans must attribute to the people an ability to
control public officials merely in virtue of the possibility that they might
coordinate their actions. But if the possibility of coordination suffices
for attributing abilities to groups, then, even in the best case, countless
groups will be dominating because it will be possible for their members
to coordinate their actions with the aim of frustrating others’ choices. We
argue the dilemma is apparent only. To make our argument, we present
a novel interpretation of the republican concept of domination with the
help of a game-theoretic model that clarifies the significance of collective
action problems for republican theory.
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Republicans hold that people are dominated, and therefore unfree, merely in
virtue of others’ having unconstrained abilities to frustrate their choices, even
if the latter are benevolent and therefore unlikely to exercise those abilities.1
Republicans further argue that public officials may dominate citizens unless sub-
ject to popular control.2 Some recent critics identify a dilemma.3 To maintain
the possibility of popular control, republicans must attribute to the people an
ability to control public officials merely in virtue of the possibility that they
might coordinate their actions. But if the mere possibility of coordination suf-
fices for attributing abilities to collections of individuals, then, as one critic puts
it, “republican freedom is impossible,” for “there are always collections of agents
who could, by coordinating, invade any individual,” and who thus would count
as sources of domination (Simpson, 2017, p. 41).
We argue that the dilemma raised by these critics is apparent only. We
present a novel interpretation of the republican concept of domination, paying
special attention to cases involving collections of agents, and show how it allows
for the possibility of popular control, without making domination ubiquitous
and therefore unavoidable. For collections of individuals to have abilities in the
relevant sense, the mere possibility of coordination is insufficient: in a sense we
will make precise, it must be the case that they would actually coordinate if
each placed sufficient value on achieving their shared aim. Not all collections
of individuals meet this condition; most are unable to surmount the barriers to
1Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Workshop in Politics, Ethics, and
Society at Washington University in St. Louis; at the Philosophy Colloquium at Davidson
College; and at the 2019 meeting of the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society. The
authors would like to thank the participants at each of these events for their very helpful
feedback. The authors are also especially grateful for comments and suggestions received
from Matthew Babb, Randy Calvert, John Lawless, Daniel Layman, Brian Tamanaha, David
Wiens, and the anonymous reviewers at AJPS.
2Significant contributions to the contemporary republican literature maintaining these
claims include Pettit (1997, 2012, 2014); Skinner (1998, 2002); Viroli (2002); Lovett (2010).
See also the papers collected in Laborde and Maynor (2009).
3See most importantly Simpson (2017), but similar arguments can be found in Dowding
(2011), Sharon (2016), List and Valentini (2016), Kolodny (2019).
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successful collective action. In a well-ordered republic, however, barriers to the
collective action sustaining popular control over at least some public officials
can be overcome. Republicans can thus explain how citizens exercise popular
control, while avoiding the implication that generic collections of individuals
have abilities to frustrate individuals’ choices.
To make this argument, we present a game-theoretic model that clarifies
the significance of collective action problems for the republican view. Though
primarily a contribution to republican theory, our paper illustrates the value of
bringing insights and tools from social science to bear on conceptual problems
in political theory. Specifically, it shows how formal models can be useful, even
when they do not generate testable predictions, as tools for conceptual analysis
(Johnson, 2014; Ingham, 2015).
We do not here present a positive argument for the republican conception
of freedom, except indirectly. By refining and clarifying republican ideas, our
analysis aims to preempt important recent criticisms. If one is going to attack
republicanism, one ought to attack the best version of that theory. The work
in this paper is thus preliminary to either a successful defense or a persuasive
critique of the republican conception of freedom.
1 Preliminaries
What are our criteria for success in characterizing republican freedom?
Our goal is to develop a political conception of freedom — that is, a con-
ception designed to serve as a political ideal. This differs from analyzing the
meaning of freedom as a concept. Generally speaking, we take freedom to be
something a well-ordered society should honor or promote. Accordingly, we
adopt a
• Pragmatic constraint : a political conception of freedom should be useful,
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meaning roughly that it should have critical force without being hopelessly
demanding.
The point of a political conception of freedom is to provide actionable guidance
in the assessment of various social arrangements as better or worse. A concep-
tion which defined freedom in such a way that it would be impossible to secure
in any reasonable degree no matter how hard we tried would presumably fail
the pragmatic constraint: it would be hopelessly demanding.4
We assume that any attractive political conception of freedom would satisfy
the pragmatic constraint. But what would qualify a conception of freedom as
republican? Here we adopt a
• Republican constraint : to be a republican conception of freedom, the con-
ception must capture several distinctively republican intuitions about free-
dom, including:
– the subject of a benevolent master is unfree;
– freedom is institutionally constituted; and
– freedom requires popular control over at least some public officials.5
Each of these intuitions is well-supported in the classical republican tradition,
and has also been embraced and elaborated by contemporary republican au-
thors.6 Each also runs counter to the familiar conception of freedom as non-
interference, as articulated by Berlin (1969) and others.
On the non-interference view, a person is free provided her choices are not
actually frustrated, as they might not be by a benevolent master. Not so, argue
4For further discussion, see Pettit (2005).
5Popular control over all public officials—including public prosecutors, judges, central
bankers, etc.—may be neither necessary for republican freedom nor desirable. Social con-
ventions, legal constraints, or other forms of oversight will often be more appropriate. Re-
publicans differ as to which public officials need to be subject to popular control under which
circumstances. Our argument does not depend on which of these views one holds.
6Here the “classical republican tradition” refers to the conventionally recognized canon of
early modern neo-roman republican authors from Machiavelli to Harrington to Madison. For
contemporary republican authors, see footnote 1 above.
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republicans. Algernon Sidney writes that the “the weight of chains, number of
stripes, hardness of labour, and other effects of a master’s cruelty, may make
one servitude more miserable than other,” but nevertheless “he is a slave who
serves the best and gentlest man in the world, as well as he who serves the
worst” (Sidney, 1996, p. 441). Glossing this sentiment, Pettit writes:
[W]hen a dominating agent is benign . . . , of course, the likelihood
of interference will be that much lower. But it is important to see
that domination goes with the accessibility of arbitrary interference
to another, and improbability of the kind in question here does not
make for inaccessibility. Someone can be in a position to interfere
with me at their pleasure, even when it is very improbable that they
will actually interfere. (Pettit, 1997, p. 64)
The non-interference view also holds that freedom is natural or pre-political:
each law, institution, or convention represents a limitation on our freedom,
even if that limitation is compensated for in other ways. Contrary to this view,
William Blackstone famously insisted that “laws, when prudently framed, are
by no means subversive but rather introductive of liberty” (Blackstone, 1979,
p. 122). Pettit expands on this claim as follows:
[T]he law need not itself represent a form of domination . . . . There
will be systems of law available, at least in principle, which are
entirely undominating and entirely consistent with freedom: not only
will they inhibit potential dominators and reduce unfreedom, they
will do so without representing a form of domination in their own
right. (Pettit, 1997, p. 66)
Finally, if, as on the non-interference view, we are free provided no one actually
frustrates our choices, then it would seem that freedom can be enjoyed in any
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form of polity, provided the rulers are suitably inclined to respect that freedom.
Against this view, Machiavelli counts as free states only those “accustomed to
living by their own laws,” not laws imposed by their rulers (Machiavelli, 1998,
p. 20). As Skinner explains:
Free states, like free persons, are thus defined by their capacity for
self-government. A free state is a community in which the actions
of the body politic are determined by the will of the members as a
whole. (Skinner, 1998, p. 26)
This is only a spare outline of some of the main features of republican theory,
but it will serve for present purposes.
The particular worry motivating this paper concerns a possible inconsistency
between the pragmatic constraint on the one hand, and the republican constraint
on the other. The issue, pressed most forcefully by Thomas Simpson but noted
also by others, can be summarized as follows.7
Suppose, to honor the republican constraint, we grant that freedom requires
citizens to be able to control certain high-ranking public officials. To honor
the pragmatic constraint, we must then believe such popular control is feasible.
Unlike the state or a business corporation, however, the people are not a group
agent in the proper sense: there are none of the institutionalized mechanisms
for ensuring the sort of ongoing consistency in action and intention needed for
group agency (List and Pettit, 2011; Pettit, 2012).8 If the people have the
ability to control public officials, then they must have this ability in virtue of
the fact that they might possibly coordinate their actions in the way needed to
sanction and discipline wayward public officials.
But if the conditions for collections of individuals to have such abilities are
7See footnote 2 above.
8Here we accept List and Pettit’s account of group agency which is not at issue in the
dispute that is the subject of this paper.
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minimal enough that citizens have the ability to control public officials, then one
may worry that we are surrounded by groups with the ability to frustrate our
choices — indeed, nearly any arbitrary set of individuals we might imagine. It is
possible, for example, that the strangers we encounter on entering a restaurant
might spontaneously team up to prevent us from entering. Republicans cannot,
so the argument goes, appeal to the improbability of this happening without
abandoning their commitment to the view that probabilities do not matter in
the analysis of freedom. Nor can they appeal to the fact that such collections
of strangers fail to qualify as group agents, because if citizens are to have the
ability to control public officials, then collections of individuals need not be
group agents in order to be the bearers of abilities. Having excluded those
grounds for appeal, it seems we must concede that domination is ubiquitous,
and freedom so defined impossible to achieve.
To avoid this dilemma, we need an analysis of freedom as non-domination
that captures all the distinctive republican intuitions, while respecting the prag-
matic constraint. We make no attempt here to defend these constraints. Per-
haps not everyone shares the intuition that the subject of a benevolent master
is unfree and so on; neither, perhaps, does everyone share the intuition that the
republican conception of freedom would be useless if domination turned out to
be ubiquitous. For present purposes we simply grant both constraints and try
to show that, within such parameters as they impose, an analysis of freedom
consistent with republican commitments is available that does not succumb to
the challenge raised by Simpson and others.
We use simple game-theoretic models to clarify the meaning and implications
of our interpretation of republican freedom. Formal models are useful tools for
conceptual analysis generally (Johnson, 2014; Ingham, 2015), but the nature of
the dilemma motivating our analysis provides an additional justification. The
6
question at the heart of the dilemma is when a collection of individuals, who
do not amount to a group agent, has an ability to frustrate another agent’s
choice. We argue that any compelling answer must recognize the importance
of collective action problems, which critics like Simpson (2017) fail to do, as we
explain at the end of section 3. Since formal models are especially useful aids for
articulating and evaluating claims about collective action, they have a valuable
role to play in this argument.
Before presenting a definition of domination by groups, and a model that il-
lustrates how groups can fail to dominate in virtue of collective action problems,
we first present a definition that covers the case of a single agent’s dominating
another, and a baseline model to illustrate the moving parts of our account.
2 A basic model of domination
Consider a simple model of an interaction between two agents, A and B. B
chooses whether to perform the action φ or not. Before she makes her choice,
A chooses whether to intervene, which refers to taking an action that affects
either the possibility of B’s φ-ing or the payoff-relevant consequences of B’s φ-
ing. An example of intervention would be a master’s instructing his foreman to
punish his slave if the slave performs the action φ. Having so intervened, φ-ing
and not φ-ing now produce different payoffs for the slave than they would have,
had the master not intervened.9 Another example would be a master’s chaining
his slave to a post, which affects the possibility of the slave’s walking away.
We will wish to consider counterfactual variation in A’s preferences. To
model such variation, we imagine “nature,” as a metaphorical player, choosing
A’s “type,” that is, whether A prefers for B to φ or not, and how much impor-
9Some interventions may change the expected payoff to B’s φ-ing, but not the actual payoff.
For example, if A makes a credible threat he does not intend to carry out, then his threat
changes B’s expected payoffs from φ-ing, but not her actual payoff from φ-ing. Such actions
are interventions, as we use the term.
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tance A attaches to B’s φ-ing relative to the possible costs of intervention. (This
terminology should not be understood to imply that A’s preferences are rooted
in fixed “natural” facts about his psychological constitution, nor even that they
are stable over time — the word type, conventional in game theory, is merely
intended to refer to A’s different possible preferences, abstracting from their
underlying causes.) Player A observes nature’s choice before choosing whether
to intervene.10
Figure 1 depicts this scenario. The pairs of numbers at the end of each
branch of the game tree represent the players’ preferences over the possible
outcomes of their interaction: the first number represents A’s preferences and
the second number B’s. Nature chooses v, which parameterizes A’s preferences.
Specifically, if v > 0, then A prefers — all else being equal — for B not to φ,
while if v < 0, he prefers for B to φ. He also prefers — again all else being
equal — not to intervene, as intervention incurs a cost c > 0, but he would be
willing to intervene, as a means of preventing B from φ-ing if (but only if) v ≥ c.
The payoffs for B indicate that in this scenario she would prefer to φ, all else
being equal, but is better off not φ-ing if A has intervened.
We should emphasize that v is to be interpreted as encoding information
about A’s psychology (e.g., his goals and the tradeoffs he is willing to make),
not information about A’s external environment (e.g., the monetary costs or
benefits of intervening). Thus, when we refer to counterfactual variation in
nature’s choice of v, we are referring to variation in facts about A’s psychology,
not variation in A’s external circumstances. Let T = (−∞,∞) be the set of A’s
possible types (the possible values of v).
A strategy for player A specifies the action that he takes — intervene, re-
10The type space is used to model counterfactual variation in A’s preferences and its effects,
not B’s uncertainty about A’s type. We do not specify B’s beliefs about A’s type because
they are unimportant for the analysis of the game’s perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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A
B
φ ¬φ
intervene
B
φ ¬φ
refrain
v
−c, 0 v − c, 1 0, 2 v, 1
Figure 1: A situation in which A has an ability to frustrate B’s φ-ing.
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frain — as a function of his type, v, while a strategy for player B specifies the
action that she takes —φ, not-φ— as a function of player A’s action. A plau-
sible assumption is that the players will choose sequentially rational strategies:
player B’s strategy will be to choose φ unless player A has chosen to intervene,
and player A’s strategy will be to intervene if v > c and refrain from intervening
if v < c. (Either action is consistent with sequential rationality if v = c.)
We now state definitions of domination and republican freedom, as they
apply to a relationship between just two agents.
D: A dominates B if A has an insufficiently constrained ability to
deliberately frustrate B’s choice whether to φ.
F: B’s choice whether to φ is not free if A has an insufficiently
constrained ability to deliberately frustrate her φ-ing.
Note that F specifies a necessary condition for political freedom. All republicans
are committed to this claim, but they disagree whether F is also a sufficient
condition for freedom.11
When does A have an ability to frustrate B’s choice whether to φ? In the
context of our simple model, we can say that
Player A has the ability to frustrate B’s choice whether to φ if
i) even when preferring to φ, B will choose not to φ ifA intervenes;
and
ii) if A prefers for B not to φ and cares enough, then A will choose
to intervene.
In our example, condition (i) holds in the postulated equilibrium because
B’s strategy was to φ if and only if A refrains from intervention. In concrete
11Skinner (1998, p. 83) and Viroli (2002, p. 54), for example, argue that freedom additionally
requires non-interference.
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terms, this condition is met when the structural context gives A power over
B or makes B dependent on A.12 A has power over B in the sense that he
has an action (intervention) by which he can make φ-ing less appealing to B,
thereby changing what she would otherwise prefer to do. Condition (ii) holds
in our example because if v > c (meaning A prefers for B not to φ and also
cares enough about B’s φ-ing, relative to the costs of intervention), then A will
rationally choose to intervene. In cases where it is possible for a single agent
to intervene in another’s choice, and condition (i) is met, it would be unusual
for condition (ii) to fail.13 The same will not be true, however, when we later
generalize the condition to cover groups of agents.
When is such an ability sufficiently constrained? Let P ⊂ T denote the
subset of types of player A for whom it would be rational to intervene. In the
example, P = {v ∈ R|v ≥ c}. This is the set of the types who prefer for
B not to φ and care enough about B’s φ-ing, relative to the associated costs
of intervening, to make intervention worthwhile. The intuitive idea is that A’s
ability to frustrate B’s choice whether to φ is sufficiently constrained if the set P
comprises — in some sense to be made more precise shortly — only types whose
logical possibility is justifiably “ignored.”
As just one example to elicit the relevant intuition, suppose that in our
example, φ-ing refers to B’s leaving her house, intervening refers to A’s holding
B captive against her will, and the cost of intervention c is a lengthy prison
sentence for A. Then P comprises only those types of A who are so deranged
that they prefer to hold B captive even though doing so will land them in prison.
12In general, the relevant structural context will be the upshot of the equilibrium behavior
of further agents, C, D, and so on. The master’s ability to frustrate the slave’s choices depends
not only on the foreman who executes the master’s instructions, but also on the courts and
officers of the state, among other collaborators, who enforce the laws upholding property rights
in human beings. Contrary to a common misperception, the republican conception of freedom
is not dyadic: we model a two-player game for expositional purposes only.
13One might imagine exotic cases where A suffers from a debilitating psychological fear of
confrontation, such that even if she cares enough for it to be rational for her to intervene, she
will nevertheless fail to do so.
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Typically, it is reasonable to ignore the logical possibility that A could have such
preferences. In this case, we would say that the law is a sufficient constraint
on A’s ability to frustrate B’s choice whether to leave the house, since the law
ensures that only ignorable types of player A would act to frustrate B’s choice.
The distinctive quality of the republican conception of freedom partly de-
rives from its regarding certain possible worlds — here, certain possible types
for player A— as significant even though they are merely counterfactual and,
indeed, even though they are improbable. Whether B’s choice is free depends,
not on A’s actual preferences — not on the actual realization of v— but instead
on what A would do in various counterfactual scenarios in which his prefer-
ences are possibly different from what they actually are. Put differently, not all
counterfactual types of player A are “ignorable.”
Consistent with that general thought, one can still generate weaker or stronger
interpretations of the republican position from different interpretations of what
makes certain types ignorable. Consider:
Strong republicanism. No logically possible type is ignorable.
This position is too strong. We introduce it here only to motivate a more
reasonable interpretation of the republican view. One can see that it is too
strong from reflecting on the example above. Suppose A and B are friends who
live together. There is a logically possible type of player A who prefers for B
not to leave the house and holds this preference so intensely that he is willing to
suffer imprisonment in order to prevent B from leaving the house. According to
the “strong republican” view, it follows that A has an insufficiently constrained
ability to frustrate B’s choice whether to leave the house, and so B’s choice is
unfree. On the strong view, freedom will be generally impossible, violating the
pragmatic constraint.14
14This seems to be an implication of the analysis proposed in List and Valentini: rather
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Here is a more plausible interpretation of the republican view:
Moderate republicanism. A subset of an agent’s possible types
is ignorable if its becoming common knowledge that the agent’s type
does not belong to that subset would have no significant practical
consequences.
It is common knowledge that the agent’s type v does not belong to a subset P ⊂
T if everyone knows that v /∈ P, everyone knows that everyone knows this, and
so on, ad infinitum. Recall the example above, in which A and B are roommates,
and the effective rule of law ensures that A would suffer severe punishment if
he tried to hold B captive. Under normal circumstances, neither B nor anyone
else would act differently if it somehow became common knowledge that A is
not prepared to spend time in prison in order to keep B from leaving the house.
Everyone already acts as if this is not a possibility, and as if everyone already
knows that it is not a possibility, and as if everyone knows that everyone knows
that it is not a possibility, and so on. Thus, if it became common knowledge
that A is not this type, no one would act any differently. Its becoming common
knowledge would have no significant practical consequences.
Contrast this situation with one in which the costs that A incurs from inter-
vention are not severe legal repercussions, but rather the kind of trivial opportu-
nity costs that accompany most action. For example, suppose that to intervene
to prevent B from φ-ing, A, a slave owner, must rise from his chair, walk across
the lawn in the blistering sun, and issue instructions to his foreman. All else
being equal, he would rather not have to do this in order to keep B from φ-ing.
It is costly, albeit trivially so. In anticipation of such situations, B, the owner’s
slave, may have reason to ingratiate herself with A, or plead with A, with the
than characterize some choices as free and others as unfree, they prefer to focus on “the ‘size’
and ‘shape’ of the set of possible worlds across which the agent suffers no constraints” (List
and Valentini, 2016, p. 1071). The analysis we propose is more tractable, in our view.
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hope of shaping A’s preferences over B’s φ-ing, specifically with the hope of
inducing in A an attitude of indifference or indulgence towards B’s φ-ing. She
may have such reasons because she is unsure whether A has a preference over
B’s φ-ing, and specifically whether A not only has a preference but cares enough
to rise from his chair, walk across the lawn in the blistering sun, and issue in-
structions to his foreman. The possible type of A who is willing to incur those
costs is not “ignorable,” because B would act differently — she would no longer
have the same incentives to ingratiate herself with A, for example — if it became
common knowledge that A is not that type. That such non-ignorable types of
A would rationally choose to intervene to prevent B from φ-ing means that A
has an insufficiently constrained ability to frustrate B’s choice whether to φ.
Because our analysis relies on a common knowledge condition, the deter-
mination of which types are ignorable will to some extent be specific to the
cultural-historical context. Our condition is similar in spirit to Pettit’s “eyeball
test” (Pettit, 2012, p. 84): roughly speaking, one might say that people can look
one another in the eye without reason for fear or deference — the eyeball test is
met — when, according to local standards, all types worthy of fear or deference
are ignorable. Importantly, however, whether the condition is satisfied does not
depend merely on whether the agent subject to power is uncertain about the
preferences of the agent with the ability to intervene.
Think of the position of a woman under traditional family law, who may be
confident that her husband is not the type to exercise his legal powers of inter-
ference in her choices. Even if the wife is confident, the types of husband who
would exercise these powers are not ignorable. Those types are non-ignorable
because if it became, not just known to the wife, but also common knowledge
that the husband is not one of those types, then the wife and others would act
differently. For example, if the husband has the power to prevent his wife from
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accepting positions of employment, then prospective employers, unsure about
the husband’s preferences and willingness to exercise this power, will have di-
minished incentives to try to recruit the woman. The woman, anticipating their
behavior, will have diminished incentives to develop the kinds of productive
skills that would make her valuable to prospective employers. If it were com-
mon knowledge that the husband is not the type to exercise his power to prevent
her from taking employment outside the home, then she and the prospective em-
ployers would act differently. On the moderate republican view we have defined,
such types of husbands are therefore non-ignorable even though the wife may
assign them zero probability.
As this example should make clear, it would be false to say that what de-
termines, on our account, whether A dominates B is the probability that A
will wish to intervene. That judgment would rest on a misunderstanding of
what makes one of A’s possible types ignorable. Nor is non-domination simply
a matter of everyone’s knowing that the husband is very unlikely to be the
intervening type. Let everyone know this, and yet the wife may not know that
prospective employers know this, and so she may choose not to invest in devel-
oping productive skills. Even supposing the woman knows that employers know
this, there may be schools whose administrators do not know that she knows
that employers know that her husband would not intervene, and thus do not
expect her to be receptive to invitations to enroll in their schools, anticipating
that she will view enrolling as fruitless. And so on. Since its becoming common
knowledge that the husband is not the intervening type would be practically
consequential, this type is not ignorable, and so his wife is dominated.
Our analysis generates standard republican judgments about canonical ex-
amples of domination. Consider:
a) The benevolent master. The slave’s choices are unfree even if the
15
slave’s master does not wish to intervene and frustrate the slave’s choices.
What matters is not the master’s actual type — not his actual prefer-
ences — but rather whether the master would rationally choose to inter-
vene if the master preferred for the slave not to φ and cared enough about
the slave’s φ-ing to make the costs of intervention worthwhile (that deter-
mines whether the master has an ability to frustrate the slave’s choice);
and whether its becoming common knowledge that the master does not
care enough to intervene would be practically consequential (that deter-
mines whether the “interventionist” types of the master are “ignorable”
and, accordingly, whether the master’s ability is sufficiently constrained).
Given background assumptions about the master-slave relationship, both
conditions will be met: non-ignorable types of the master will rationally
choose to intervene in the slave’s choices. That is true whether the master
is actually benevolent or not.
b) The rule of law. In the absence of law, people will generally be unfree in
their choices. For example, B’s choice whether to travel unmolested will
not be a free one, as various potential bandits will have insufficiently con-
strained abilities to frustrate her choice: non-ignorable types of the people
she might encounter in her travels would rationally choose to intervene to
prevent her from traveling unmolested, given the payments they would be
able to extract from her in the absence of any legal repercussions. Thus,
as the classical republicans claim, freedom is institutionally constituted,
not natural: only with the effective rule of law do people become free to
travel unmolested. Note, however, that even with the introduction of legal
sanctions, there will still be some types — hardened criminals, say — who
will rationally choose to intervene and frustrate B’s choices. But, where
the rule of law accomplishes what republicans expect it to accomplish,
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those types will be “ignorable” in ordinary circumstances.
c) Domination in the workplace. Suppose A is an employer and B his
employee, and A threatens to fire B unless she dresses in a particular
way, which she would otherwise prefer not to do. This can be viewed as
a reduction in effective compensation in so far as the employee is loathe
to accommodate the request. In a perfectly competitive labor market,
B would just quit and work for a different employer willing to pay her
marginal revenue product. Anticipating this reaction, A would therefore
not choose to intervene, condition (ii) would fail, and so A would not dom-
inate B. But under realistic conditions, it will not be so easy for many
employees to quit.15 Knowing this, non-ignorable types of employers may
be disposed to intervene in the employee’s choices. Under such conditions,
employers will dominate their employees in various workplace choices un-
less suitably constrained. Public provisions for basic needs can mitigate
this domination, as can policies that strengthen workers’ collective bar-
gaining rights: the former place an absolute limit on how far employers
can reduce the value of employment, while the latter enhance the threat
of strikes which might deter intervention by all but ignorable types of
employers.
3 Domination by plural agents
So far, we have only considered the sense in which a single agent, A, may
dominate another agent, B. We now extend the analysis and articulate the
sense in which a plurality of agents might dominate B.
As before, it will be useful to have a concrete model to illustrate the concepts
15This may be because market concentration grants employers monopsony power, or because
employees must bear the costs of searching for alternative employment. See Posner and Weyl
(2018), ch. 4, for discussion of relevant literature.
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we define below. Consider the following variation on our initial example: as
before, an agent B chooses whether to perform an action φ or not. Before she
makes her choice, two agents, A1 and A2, simultaneously choose whether to
contribute to a joint effort of intervening in B’s choice. Specifically, if, but only
if, both of the agents choose to contribute, the intervention is successful and the
consequences of B’s φ-ing are modified (just as when, in the original example, A
intervenes). For example, the two agents may be the joint owners of a business
and B their employee, and “contributing to a joint effort of intervening” may
refer to agreeing to work together to draft a new workplace policy according to
which employees are fired if they choose to φ. Alternatively, A1 and A2 may be
two strangers who, acting together, could intervene to prevent B from traveling
freely through town.
As before, we will wish to consider counterfactual variation in the prefer-
ences of A1 and A2 over B’s φ-ing. To model such variation, we again imagine
“nature,” as a player, choosing their types — specifically the payoffs v1 and v2
that they receive when player B chooses not to φ— at the beginning of the
game. Let T = (−∞,∞) be the set of Ai’s possible types (the possible values
of vi). To simplify the model, we will assume that players A1 and A2 each
observe nature’s choices, that is, they each know both their own type and the
other player’s type.16
Figure 2 depicts the situation arising after the determination of the players’
types. Players A1 and A2 simultaneously choose whether to contribute. (Equiv-
alently, first A1 chooses whether to contribute and then A2, not having observed
A1’s choice and unsure whether he is at the decision node on the left or the node
on the right, chooses whether to contribute.) B then chooses whether to φ. In
the vectors of payoffs after each branch, the first number is A1’s payoff, the sec-
16Nothing important hinges on this assumption. See the online supplementary materials
for an explanation.
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φ ¬φ
contribute
B
φ ¬φ
don’t contribute
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B
φ ¬φ
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B
φ ¬φ
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A2
−c−c
0
 v1 − cv2 − c
1
 −c0
1
 v1 − cv2
0
  0−c
1
  v1v2 − c
0
 00
1
 v1v2
0

Figure 2: A situation in which A1 and A2 may, or may not, have an ability to
frustrate B’s φ-ing, depending on which equilibrium they find themselves in.
ond A2’s, and the third B’s. The numbers represent the assumption that player
B would prefer to φ, all else being equal, and A1 and A2 would each prefer not
to contribute to the joint preventative effort, all else being equal (hence the −c
appearing in Ai’s payoff after any branch in which Ai contributes). If vi > 0,
then Ai prefers for B not to φ, and if vi ≥ c, then Ai would be willing to incur
the costs of contributing to the intervention if Ai expected the intervention to
be successful.
A strategy for playerAi, for i = 1, 2, specifies the action that he takes — contribute
or not — as a function of nature’s determination of the types, v1 and v2, while
a strategy for player B specifies the action that she takes —φ, not-φ— as a
function of the actions taken by players A1 and A2. The game has multiple
perfect Bayesian equilibria; we focus on two that are plausible focal points.17
17See the online appendix for further discussion.
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In each, player B chooses to φ unless players A1 and A2 have successfully in-
tervened (that is, each chosen to contribute). In one, players A1 and A2 solve
their coordination problem, each using the strategy of contributing if and only
if v1, v2 ≥ c. In the second equilibrium, they each use the strategy of never
contributing. In that equilibrium, they suffer from a collective action problem:
even when v1, v2 ≥ c and they would each benefit from a successful intervention,
neither has any reason to contribute given his correct belief that the other will
not contribute.
With this game as a point of reference, we now state general definitions of
domination and republican freedom.
D: a group of agents A1, . . . , Am dominate B if they have an insuf-
ficiently constrained (collective) ability to deliberately frustrate B’s
choice whether to φ.
F: B’s choice whether to φ is not free if a group of agents A1, . . . , Am
has an insufficiently constrained (collective) ability to deliberately
frustrate her φ-ing.
When m = 1, these definitions reduce to the original definitions, which describe
the special case in which a group of one agent dominates another agent.
When does a group A1, . . . , Am have the collective ability to frustrate B’s
choice whether to φ? Let us say that:
A group of agents A1, . . . , Am has the ability to frustrate B’s
choice whether to φ if
i) even when preferring to φ, B will choose not to φ if each agent
A1, . . . , Am chooses an action such that the profile of their ac-
tions constitutes a joint intervention; and
ii) if each agent A1, . . . , Am prefers for B not to φ and cares
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enough, then each will choose an action such that the profile of
their actions constitutes a joint intervention.18
In the two equilibria described, condition (i) holds because B’s postulated strat-
egy was to φ unless A1 and A2 each contribute and successfully intervene. Con-
dition (ii) holds in one, but not the other equilibrium. In the equilibrium where
players A1 and A2 overcome their potential collective action problem, they each
use a strategy of contributing if and only if v1, v2 ≥ c. In other words, if each of
them prefers for B not to φ (meaning v1, v2 > 0) and each cares enough about
B’s φ-ing relative to the costs of intervention (specifically, if v1, v2 ≥ c), then
each chooses to contribute, and the profile of their actions is such that they
successfully intervene. But in the other equilibrium, where the collective action
problem is not overcome, condition (ii) fails to hold. For in that equilibrium, no
matter how much A1 and A2 care about B’s φ-ing relative to the costs of inter-
vention — no matter how great v1 and v2 — they each choose not to contribute
and thus fail to intervene.
As this example illustrates, one reason that a group of agents A1, . . . , Am
may not dominate an agent B is that collective action problems deprive them
of a genuine ability to frustrate B’s choice. It may be possible for them to so
act that B’s choice is frustrated — condition (i) may hold; but if they will fail
to so act, irrespective of how strongly they prefer for B not to φ— if condition
(ii) fails to hold — then they lack a genuine ability to frustrate B’s choice and
do not dominate B.19
Collective action problems come in many varieties, some being more difficult
to overcome than others. A group of agents may fail simply because they lack
a mechanism for communicating and coordinating their actions. Our example
18Here we refer to a “profile of actions” because in many cases not every agent in a group
need perform the same action for a successful intervention to occur. See footnote 18.
19Thus our analysis differs from that of List and Valentini (2016), which counts all such
possibilities as genuine abilities.
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shows that a group can fail in this way even in conditions that are conducive
to collective action. The model makes the unrealistic simplifying assumption
that it is common knowledge when all members of the group care more about
preventingB from φ-ing than avoiding the cost of contributing to an intervention
(the realized values of vi are common knowledge). It is also common knowledge
in our model that each must contribute to the intervention if they are to keep
B from φ-ing: there is no possibility of “free-riding.” Even so, it does not follow
that the members of the group will rationally act so as to intervene whenever
they prefer for B not to φ: despite unrealistic assumptions that stack the deck
in favor of collective action, they might still form self-fulfilling expectations that
no one will contribute to the joint intervention.
In other more realistic cases, the deck is stacked against collective action.
Normally, it will be unnecessary for every member of a group to contribute to
an intervention for it to be successful, and so each individual may hope to “free
ride,” reaping the benefits of an intervention without contributing to the effort.20
Since the members of a generic collection of individuals, who are all strangers,
will normally be unsure about each other’s preferences, nearly insurmountable
obstacles stand in the way of coordinating expectations on exactly who will make
the necessary contributions. In the real world, the most realistic equilibrium is
thus the one where no one contributes to the intervention, however strongly each
might prefer for B not to φ. When the members of a multitude find themselves
in that kind of equilibrium, they lack a genuine ability to frustrate B’s choice
even though it is possible for them each to act so as to collectively frustrate B’s
choice.
20Our game incorporates a special case of a Palfrey-Rosenthal contribution game in which a
group with n members succeeds if and only if at least k members contribute, where 2 ≤ k ≤ n
(Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984). Even if the threshold k is less than n, there are equilibria in
which the group overcomes its collective action problem, with exactly k members of the group
contributing, but those equilibria are not very plausible for the reasons explained in the main
text.
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None of this is to deny that some groups have mechanisms for coordinating
their actions, and will thus have abilities to frustrate individuals’ choices. The
point is just that for generic collections of agents, the mere fact that each
agent cares a great deal about stopping some individual from φ-ing is no reason
by itself to expect that they will undertake the actions necessary to stop that
individual from φ-ing. In contrast to single-agent cases, one cannot reliably infer
that a group has an ability to frustrate an individual’s choice from the mere fact
that it is possible for the group to do so.
Among those special groups that have solved their collective action problems,
and thus have abilities to frustrate individuals’ choices, such abilities, like those
of a single agent, may still be sufficiently constrained so as to not count as
dominating. In line with our earlier analysis, we will say that the ability of
A1, . . . , Am to frustrate B’s choice is sufficiently constrained if the combinations
of types who would rationally choose to act so as to frustrate B’s choice are
ignorable. Specifically, let Ti denote Ai’s possible types, so that T1 × · · · × Tm
denotes the set of all possible combinations of types for the agents A1, . . . , Am.
Let P ⊂ T1×· · ·×Tm denote the set of type combinations who would rationally
choose contributions that, in aggregate, make for a successful intervention in
B’s choice. Then the ability of A1, . . . , Am to frustrate B’s choice is sufficiently
constrained if P is ignorable. Like before, a subset of T1 × · · · × Tm is ignorable
if its becoming common knowledge that the types of A1, . . . , Am do not lie in
this set would have no practical consequences.21
21Note that whether a group’s ability to frustrate is constrained turns on the ignorability
of profiles of types, not on the separate ignorability of each individual member’s type taken
in isolation. For example, suppose that a group of agents A1, . . . , Am vote on whether to
retain an employee, B, who will be fired unless they all vote to retain her. For any particular
agent Ai, its becoming common knowledge that Ai is not the type who would vote against
B may have no impact on anyone’s behavior — the set of Ai’s types who would vote against
B may be ignorable. At the same time, its becoming common knowledge that none of the
agents A1, . . . , Am is the type to vote against B might very well affect the behavior of B or
others — the set of all profiles of types in which at least one agent would vote against B might
be non-ignorable.
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The following examples illustrate the above ideas.
a) Perfectly competitive markets. If a monopolist A formed a preference
over a consumer B’s purchasing decisions and cared enough (think of
paternalistic firms running “company towns”), it would intervene in B’s
choices, refusing to sell or charging B a price she cannot afford. It would
dominate her. But in a perfectly competitive market, no firm A or group
of firms A1, . . . , Am will dominate any consumer B. Given her budget, B
will face a menu of affordable bundles of goods and services, and no firm
or group of firms will have an effective ability to frustrate her choice. It
is true that, if each firm reduced its output, the market price would rise,
preventing B from choosing the bundle of goods and services she otherwise
would. But even if each firm for some reason formed a preference over B’s
choice, no firm would unilaterally reduce its output, because unilateral
action would have a negligible effect on the market price, and no firm would
expect any other to follow suit. The logic of collective action explains why
they lack an ability to frustrate B’s choice in a competitive market. Of
course, markets are unlikely to remain competitive without fair practice
laws that ban collusion and price-fixing agreements. But the significance
of such laws is not that they make it impossible for all the firms in the
market to jointly intervene in the individual’s choice by restricting output.
Rather, their role is to prevent the firms from pursuing solutions to their
collective action problem.
b) Consumer boycott. Suppose that each member of a group of consumers
A1, . . . , Am prefers for a firm B not to engage in some practice, and they
all care enough about B’s practice to contribute to a boycott provided
the others do as well. Their collective action problem might be overcome
by a consumer advocacy group (since this sort of coordination, unlike
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price-fixing, is not legally barred). If so, and if their intervention would
induce B to end the targeted practice, then on our analysis they have a
genuine ability to frustrate B’s choices. Their ability may not be suffi-
ciently constrained — the types of consumers who would so intervene may
be non-ignorable. In that case, the consumers dominate the firm’s choice.
Ordinarily, this does not concern us, since we don’t care about the free-
dom of corporations. However, there might be problematic cases, as for
example boycotts of stores that voluntarily desegregated in the civil rights
era.
c) Spontaneous mob. It is possible for a set of strangers in a restaurant
to block a prospective customer from entering the restaurant if enough
of them act in concert. But in a healthy society they will normally lack
the ability to do so owing to collective action problems. Imagine each
restaurant patron, upon seeing B approach, prefers that she not enter.
Even if each would be willing to contribute to a joint effort to block B’s
entrance — say, by congregating near the entryway — none will contribute,
anticipating that unilateral action will be ineffective. Condition (ii), nec-
essary for the group to have a real ability to frustrate B’s choice to φ,
will fail to hold. Social norms may further exacerbate the collective action
problem by creating an expectation that any attempt to unilaterally test
the waters will incur social disapproval.
Say that a group A1, . . . , Am is a team if it has the effective ability to frustrate
B’s choices, that is, if both conditions (i) and (ii) hold, while a group is a mere
multitude if, owing to some collective action problem, condition (ii) fails to hold.
Mere multitudes cannot dominate anyone. Even though it is often possible for
the members of a mere multitude to so act that an individual would be frustrated
in her choices — even though condition (i) often holds for various collections of
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agents — collective action is not a trivial accomplishment. Condition (ii) will
fail for generic collections of agents.
We can now directly respond to the challenge motivating this paper. Simpson
(2017) entertains a condition for a group’s having an ability that is, on its face,
similar to ours.22 Yet he claims that his condition will be satisfied for generic
collections of individuals, while we claim that ours will be satisfied only in special
cases, where groups have mechanisms to solve their collective action problems
and the resulting abilities to frustrate the individual’s choices are insufficiently
constrained. To see the reasons we come to a different conclusion, consider
Simpson’s example of “a Dalit (‘Untouchable’) in a rural area of India breaking a
caste norm” in the presence of other villagers. The villagers, by joining together,
could prevent the infraction, but they have each come to repudiate caste norms.
Do they dominate him in this case? Simpson claims that republicans must say
that they do if all that keeps them from interfering in the Dalit’s choices is their
moral repudiation of caste norms, a merely “internal” psychological constraint.
In that case, they have an unconstrained power to interfere, by coordinating
their actions. But if the Dalit is dominated in such a case — which Simpson
believes is not atypical in its essential features — then “republican freedom is
impossible” (Simpson, 2017, p. 33–34).
On our account, the crucial questions are, first, whether the other villagers
would intervene if they preferred for the Dalit not to violate the caste norm and
cared enough relative to the costs of intervening; and, second, whether the type
profiles satisfying this condition are ignorable. Simpson’s construction of the
example does not answer these questions. To see why, consider two variations
on the example.
22“Imagine that each member of G were to will to invade A, by coordinating. To the extent
possible, hold fixed everything else, including the wills of all other agents. Then ask whether
they invade A. If so, then the members of G have the power to invade A, otherwise not”
(Simpson, 2017, p. 40).
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In the first, not only does each villager repudiate caste norms (as Simpson
supposes) but everyone believes that everyone repudiates caste norms. Now if
each villager were privately to have a change of heart and come to prefer that
the Dalit not violate the norm, none would expect anyone else to join him in
enforcing the caste norm. For, by hypothesis, everyone believes that everyone
repudiates caste norms. If it is costly to contribute to such a joint intervention,
none of the villagers would rationally choose to do so, anticipating that their
effort would be in vain.23 Thus, the first necessary condition for domination
fails to hold; the group lacks a genuine ability to intervene in the Dalit’s choice,
owing to the collective action problem.
Contrast this situation with one in which, as a matter of common knowl-
edge, people endorse caste norms and are generally willing to join with others
to enforce them. That common knowledge would plausibly sustain collective
action: if each villager preferred for the Dalit not to violate the norm, then,
anticipating that others share their preference and will join in the effort, they
would each contribute to the joint intervention to enforce the norm. And if
it is commonly believed that the typical villager is willing to do this, then it
would of course be consequential if it somehow became common knowledge that
the actual villagers happen not to be willing to join in such interventions; such
combinations of types would be non-ignorable.24 Under those specific assump-
tions, republicans quite rightly hold that the Dalit is dominated, even if, as it
happens, he is in the presence only of atypical villagers who have repudiated
23Might the joint intervention arise under these assumptions through an unintended cascade,
where first one villager moves against the Dalit even though he has little reason to expect the
intervention will succeed; then, observing the first mover, a second villager, now sufficiently
confident that the intervention will succeed, joins in; then a third, and so on? If that is what
would happen given that each villager preferred for B not to violate the caste norm, then
the group would have an ability to intervene. But this profile of types in many cases might
be ignorable. For example, the type of player A1 who is willing to contribute to such an
intervention, even though (as in our version of the example) he doubts anyone will follow suit,
is plausibly ignorable.
24More precisely, the profiles of types that induce such interventions are non-ignorable.
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caste norms and are not the types to contribute to joint interventions to enforce
them.
4 Popular control
For the most part, a well-ordered republic secures our freedom from domination
in everyday interactions with fellow citizens through the effective rule of law
and basic public welfare provisions, and it will be the state that provides these
services under modern conditions. But if the state is powerful enough to secure
citizens’ non-domination in their private relationships with each other, there is
a danger that those public officials who direct the state will dominate citizens.
What protects our freedom from this threat?25
Referring back to our basic model, suppose that A is a public official and
B an ordinary citizen. Let φ-ing refer to the exercise of some legally protected
basic liberty, say, publishing an article critical of the government. Before B
chooses whether to φ or not, A chooses whether to intervene. Here an inter-
vention might be instructing the police to arrest people who publish seditious
articles. The public official will assuredly have the ability to frustrate B’s choice
whether to φ: if A intervenes, B will choose not to publish a seditious article,
satisfying condition (i); and A will choose to intervene if he prefers for B not
to publish seditious articles and cares enough, satisfying condition (ii). It fol-
lows on the republican view that B will not be free to publish articles critical
of the government unless the public official’s ability to so intervene is suitably
constrained. It will be suitably constrained, on our analysis, if and only if the
types of public official who would rationally intervene are all ignorable.
So far in our paper we have mostly considered examples in which agents are
25We focus here on the danger that public officials will dominate citizens, becoming their
“rulers” instead of public servants. Alternatively, one might worry about the possibility that
the state itself, as a corporate agent, will dominate citizens.
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constrained by the law. But in the case of especially high-level public officials,
the ultimate source of constraint might have to be different. The basic liberties
may be written down in law, constitutional or otherwise, but what guarantees
that powerful top public officials will respect those laws? The republican answer
is the citizens themselves, empowered with the means to control public officials
and virtuously disposed to do their part in exercising those powers when neces-
sary.26 Civic virtue and popular control are thus both central to the republican
project.
The people are not a proper group agent, however. If they have an ability to
control their public officials, it must be in the nature of a collective ability they
hold as a plurality of agents. In section 3 we defended an analysis of what it
means for a plurality of agents to have the collective ability to frustrate another
agent’s choices, and showed that on this analysis domination is not ubiquitous.
We must now explain why it leaves open the possibility that citizens may have
the ability to control public officials, preventing them from turning into rulers
who dominate them.
Suppose that citizens have control over their public officials in this sense: if
sufficiently many citizens preferred for their public officials to respect and enforce
the law, and if those citizens cared enough about the issue, then they would
choose actions — voting out corrupt elected officials, protesting their abuses,
petitioning, and so on — that would in turn induce the relevant public officials to
respect and enforce the law.27 And suppose, further, that citizens are “virtuous”
in the following sense: they not only prefer for their public officials to respect
26We need not take any stand on exactly which public officials need to be under popular
control (see footnote 4 above). The question we are addressing is whether, assuming popular
control is sometimes necessary for republican freedom, we can avoid the conclusion that
domination is ubiquitous while explaining the feasibility of whatever sort of popular control
is required.
27See Ingham (2019) for an explanation of how multiple majorities could have control in
this sense, at the same time, even if citizens’ preferences do not aggregate into a coherent
“popular will.”
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the law, but they also care enough about the rule of law that they are prepared
to exercise their control over public officials, and choose the actions that induce
their public officials to respect the laws when necessary. Finally, suppose that
citizens’ control over public officials is “robust” in the following sense: these
actions induce the desired behavior in all but ignorable types of public officials,
e.g., types of public officials who do not care about losing office or suffering even
worse repercussions, like imprisonment, for corrupt behavior. Then the public
official’s ability to frustrate the citizen’s choice whether to publish the article
will be suitably constrained: only ignorable types of the public official, who
do not care about suffering electoral defeat or other repercussions, will deviate
from the law and intervene in the citizen’s choice.
Importantly, the citizens’ collective ability to control public officials in this
way is the fruit of the right institutional environment — one that institutional-
izes mechanisms of popular control — and the right political culture — one that
gives citizens confidence that enough of their fellow citizens will join in collec-
tive action to resist officials’ abuses of power, and instils in them a sense of
civic duty to do their bit when enough others do theirs. Together, the right
institutional environment and corresponding political culture make republican
freedom sustainable “in equilibrium.” This is not a trivial accomplishment.
Only in a well-ordered republic do the usual barriers to collective action become
surmountable, so that a critical mass of citizens becomes a latent team ready to
exercise popular control. It may have been possible for the people living under
traditional European monarchies to control their public officials through an im-
plicit threat of revolution, but absent coordination mechanisms they normally
lacked the ability to do so, and successful revolutions were accordingly rare. The
people in such societies were mere multitudes.
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5 Conclusion
Republicans hold that people are dominated if they are exposed to others’ un-
constrained abilities to frustrate their choices. To explain the sense in which
a group could dominate an individual, we need an account of what it means
for a group to have an ability. Critics of the republican position have exploited
the ambiguity in this notion, arguing that that if citizens, as a group, have the
ability to control public officials, then republicans must also concede that indi-
viduals face innumerable groups with unconstrained abilities to frustrate their
choices.
In reply, we have given an account of the conditions under which groups
have abilities, and we have used it to formulate a novel interpretation of free-
dom as non-domination. A group lacks an ability to frustrate an individual’s
choice if — owing to collective action problems — its members would fail to act
in the ways necessary to frustrate her choice, no matter how strong their shared
preferences over her choice. Since generic collections of agents face collective
action problems, they do not dominate anyone; they are mere multitudes, not
latent teams. But — turning to the other horn of the dilemma — citizens may
still be said to control public officials in a well-designed republic, where political
institutions and civic culture help them surmount collective action problems.
We conclude with a question concerning popular control and non-domination.
Popular control is one mechanism by which public officials, contemplating in-
terventions that deviate from existing law, can be suitably constrained. But it
is unrealistic to suppose that even the most comprehensive legal system could
fully determine the exercise of public authority, were this even desirable. Con-
siderable areas of discretion will necessarily remain. Some of this will take the
form of agency discretion, as when central banks have the authority to set inter-
est rate policies. The most important form of discretionary authority, however,
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will be legislative: determining what the laws are going to be in the first place.
Significantly, popular control as such does not eliminate discretion so much
as relocate it. To the extent that the people determine how public officials
exercise their discretionary authority, it would seem that the said discretion
really lies with popular majorities. Conversely, to the extent that the ability of
popular majorities to direct discretionary authority is incomplete, any residual
discretion necessarily falls to the relevant public officials. Someone will have to
decide whether gambling should be outlawed or not, for example, and if it’s not
the people themselves who decide, then it will be public officials (legislators),
and vice versa. Thus it is incumbent on republicans to provide an account of the
conditions — if any — under which the exercise of public discretionary authority
does not compromise our freedom.
One possibility is simply to concede that discretionary public authority en-
tails some degree of domination. Since discretionary authority cannot be fully
eliminated from public life, the relevant questions will be who should exercise
how much of it in which domains. The answers will involve a complex balancing
of the value of freedom from domination against other goods served by discre-
tion. For example, should we prioritize freedom from domination by making
legislation difficult and rare, even at the cost of inflexibility and inefficiency, or
the reverse?
Another familiar response is to argue that so long as certain conditions
are met, the exercise of discretionary public authority by the people themselves
(through their elected representatives) over themselves does not constitute dom-
ination in the relevant sense. Pettit appeals, by analogy, to the intuition that
if Andrea gives the key to her alcohol cupboard to Bob, with instructions not
to give it back except on twenty-four hours notice, then Bob does not dominate
her when he refuses to deviate from her instructions (Pettit, 2012, pp. 57–58).
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Given the tangential relationship of these issues to the main topic of this
paper, we do not here take a position on the merits of these or other possible
responses. We merely flag them as important topics for future work.
33
References
Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford University Press.
Blackstone, William. 1979. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Vol. 4.
University of Chicago Press.
Dowding, Keith. 2011. “Republican Freedom, Rights, and the Coalition Prob-
lem.” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 10(3): 301–322.
Ingham, Sean. 2015. “Theorems and Models in Political Theory: An Applica-
tion to Pettit on Popular Control.” The Good Society 24(1): 98–117.
Ingham, Sean. 2019. Rule by Multiple Majorities: A New Theory of Popular
Control. Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, James. 2014. “Models among the Political Theorists.” American
Journal of Political Science 58(3):547–560.
Kolodny, Nikolo. 2019. Being under the Power of Others. In Republicanism and
Democracy, ed. Yiftah Elizar and Genevie`ve Rousselie`re. Cambridge University
Press.
Laborde, Ce´cile and John Maynor. 2009. Republicanism and Political Theory.
John Wiley & Sons.
List, Christian and Laura Valentini. 2016. “Freedom as Independence.” Ethics
126(4): 1043–1074.
List, Christian and Philip Pettit. 2011. Group Agency: The Possibility, Design,
and Status of Corporate Agents. Oxford University Press.
Lovett, Frank. 2010. A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford
University Press.
Machiavelli, Niccolo´. 1998. The Prince. University of Chicago Press.
34
Palfrey, Thomas R. and Howard Rosenthal. 1984. “Participation and the Pro-
vision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis.” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 24(2): 171–193.
Pettit, Philip. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.
Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2005. The Domination Complaint. In Political Exclusion and
Domination, ed. Melissa S. Williams and Stephen Macedo. New York University
Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2012. On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model
of Democracy. Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2014. Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World.
W.W. Norton & Company.
Posner, Eric A. and E. Glen Weyl. 2018. Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism
and Democracy for a Just Society. Princeton University Press.
Sharon, Assaf. 2016. “Domination and the Rule of Law.” Oxford Studies in
Political Philosophy 2: 128–55.
Sidney, Algernon. 1996. Discourses concerning Government. Liberty Fund.
Simpson, Thomas W. 2017. “The Impossibility of Republican Freedom.” Phi-
losophy & Public Affairs 45(1):27–53.
Skinner, Quentin. 1998. Liberty before Liberalism. Cambridge University Press.
Skinner, Quentin. 2002. A Third Concept of Liberty. In Proceedings of the
British Academy 117: 237–268.
Viroli, Maurizio. 2002. Republicanism. Hill & Wang.
35
Supplementary Material for Online Appendix
Original model
We present here, for ease of reference, the original version of the model of a
latent team, from section 3 of the manuscript, before presenting an extension
with incomplete information.
An agent B chooses whether to perform an action φ or not. Before she
makes her choice, two agents, A1 and A2, simultaneously choose whether to
contribute to a joint effort of intervening in B’s choice. Specifically, if, but only
if, both of the agents choose to contribute, the intervention is successful and
the consequences of B’s φ-ing are modified. For example, the two agents may
be the joint owners of a business and B their employee, and “contributing to
a joint effort of intervening” may refer to agreeing to work together to draft a
new workplace policy according to which employees are fired if they choose to
φ. Alternatively, A1 and A2 may be two strangers who, acting together, could
intervene to prevent B from traveling freely through town.28
To model counterfactual variation in the preferences of A1 and A2, we imag-
ine “nature,” at the beginning of the game, choosing their types: the payoffs v1
and v2 that they receive when player B chooses not to φ. Here, we assume that
players A1 and A2 each observe nature’s choices, that is, they each know both
their own type and the other player’s type. In the next section, we assume in-
stead that they each know their own type but are uncertain of the other player’s
type. Throughout, we assume that B does not observe their types, but has be-
liefs represented by some probability distribution over nature’s choices. There
is no need to specify the distribution; whatever B’s beliefs, the only sequentially
rational strategy is φ unless A1 and A2 have each contributed.
28In these examples, the relevant agents are individuals, but in principle they might be
group agents, as when a plurality of business corporations team up for some joint purpose.
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The figure below depicts the situation arising after the determination of the
players’ types. Players A1 and A2 simultaneously choose whether to contribute.
Having made their choices, player B then chooses whether to φ. In the vectors
of payoffs after each branch, the first number is A1’s payoff, the second is A2’s,
and the third is B’s. A strategy for player A1 or A2 is a function that assigns
to each possible pair (v1, v2) of realized types the player’s action, contribute or
not.
A1
B
φ ¬φ
contribute
B
φ ¬φ
don’t contribute
contribute
B
φ ¬φ
contribute
B
φ ¬φ
don’t contribute
don’t contribute
A2

−c
−c
0


v1 − c
v2 − c
1


−c
0
1


v1 − c
v2
0


0
−c
1


v1
v2 − c
0


0
0
1


v1
v2
0

A strategy for playerAi is a function that specifies the action he takes — contribute,
don’t contribute — as a function of the pair (v1, v2) that nature chooses. A strat-
egy for player B is a function that specifies the action she takes —φ, not-φ— as
a function of the actions taken by A1 and A2.
The game has infinitely many perfect Bayesian equilibria. In each equilib-
rium, player B’s strategy is to φ unless A1 and A2 have each chosen to con-
tribute; as noted above, this is the only sequentially rational strategy for B,
whatever B’s beliefs about the distribution from which nature chooses v1 and
v2. In every equilibrium, A1 and A2 use the same strategy. We focus on two
equilibria that are plausible focal points.29 In one, A1 and A2 never choose
29As an example of one of the infinitely many equilibria we ignore, suppose A1 and A2 each
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to contribute. In the other, each uses a strategy of contributing if and only if
v1, v2 ≥ c.
Revised model with incomplete information
We now consider a revised model that shows that our conclusion in the main
text, made on the basis of the model from the previous section, is not just a
consequence of our simplifying assumption that A1 and A2 observe the other’s
type. The conclusion, recall, was that the two players might overcome their
collective action problem and have an ability to frustrate B’s choice, but they
might also not; one cannot conclude that they will act to frustrate B’s choice
merely from the assumption that they are rational and care a lot about frustrat-
ing B’s choice. In the original model, that conclusion followed because there was
an equilibrium in which they each contribute when they place sufficient value on
frustrating B’s choice, but also an equilibrium in which neither contributes, no
matter how much value they attach to frustrating B’s choice. We will show that
the same conclusion holds of the revised model where A1 and A2 are uncertain
about the other’s type.
Assume that players A1 and A2 each observe their own type but not the
other’s, and, as before, B observes neither player’s type. A strategy for player
A1 is now a function mapping a realized value of v1 to an action — contribute
or not — and a strategy for player A2 is a function mapping a realized value
of v2 to an action — contribute or not. Player B’s strategy set remains the
same as before. Assume v1 and v2 are distributed identically and independently
according to a distribution with cumulative distribution function F .
We characterize two perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies. Sequential
rationality requires, as before, that player B choose to φ unless both A1 and
A2 have contributed to a successful intervention. Consider now strategies for
use a strategy of contributing if and only if v1, v2 ≥ 2c.
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players A1 and A2 with the following “cutoff” form: contribute if and only if
vi ≥ v¯. Assume the players use these strategies, and consider the payoff to
player Ai of following it (for each i = 1, 2). If Ai does not contribute, his payoff
is 0, while if he contributes, his expected payoff (given that Aj (j 6= i) and
player B are using the postulated strategies) is (1−F (v¯))vi−c. Thus, following
the strategy is optimal if
vi ≥ c
1− F (v¯)
Thus, the postulated strategy will be part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if
there is a number v¯ such that the inequality holds if and only if vi ≥ v¯. Under
certain assumptions about c and F , such a number will exist. For example, if
F is the uniform distribution and c = 1/4, then such an equilibrium exists with
v¯ = 1/2 as the threshold.
There is also an equilibrium in whichA1 andA2 each choose not to contribute
irrespective of their type (and B’s strategy is the same as before).
In the first equilibrium, A1 and A2 will have an ability to frustrate B’s
choice, as they will choose to contribute to a successful intervention if and only
if they each prefer for B not to φ and care enough (if v1, v2 ≥ v¯). In the latter,
they will lack this ability.
Thus, the model that incorporates uncertainty about others’ types produces
the same conclusion: in one equilibrium, A1 and A2 are a latent team, who will
cooperate to achieve a shared aim of preventing B from φ-ing if they each prefer
for her not to φ and care enough; while in another equilibrium, they are a mere
multitude, hamstrung by the collective action problem.
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